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ARTICLES
Belladonna bushes, territorial
terriers and gates giving way:




The author revisits the law on occupiers’ liability
under reference to the recent decision inAnderson
v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171.
Introduction
The law of delict is replete with cases in which
occupiers of premises have incurred liability in
respect of a wide range of circumstances. Among
some of the better known examples are those
involving the death of a seven year old child who
ate easily accessible poisonous berries from a
belladonna shrub in a public park (Taylor v
GlasgowCorporation [1922] 1 A.C. 44; [1921] All
E.R. Rep. 1; 1922 S.C. (H.L.) 1; 1921 2 S.L.T. 254)
and injuries to a receptionist who was bitten by a
pugnacious West Highland terrier in the garden of
a veterinary surgery (Hill v Lovett, 1992 S.L.T.
994). The latest addition to the jurisprudence in this
area, Anderson v Imrie [2016] CSOH 171; 2017
Rep. L.R. 21; 2017 G.W.D. 1-11, relates to a heavy
stock gate falling on a child on farmyard premises.
It provides a useful reminder of the duty incumbent
upon an occupier of premises to those entering upon
the premises and, more specifically, it serves as a
cautionary tale in relation to the potential for
liability to be imposed upon an occupier in respect
of the supervision of children.
The law
The modern law on occupiers’ liability is found in
the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960.
Liability under the Act is incurred only in respect
of those entering upon the relevant premises. The
duty imposed by the statutory scheme does not
extend to neighbouring proprietors or passers by
although liability may be incurred to such persons
by other means, by way of the law of negligence
or the law of nuisance, for example. The 1960 Act
requires the occupier of premises to take reasonable
care in the circumstances in respect of persons
entering upon the premises (see s.2(1) of the Act).
Under the common law (which had been heavily
influenced by English principles) the duty owed to
a person entering upon property depended upon the
status of that person, namely whether he or she was
a licensee, invitee or trespasser. Liability was
incurred to a trespasser, for example, only in respect
of deliberate wrongdoing. The common law has
been described as presenting a “complex situation”
whereby “[t]he established need to identify
categories of persons entering upon premises had
led to fine distinctions which made little practical
sense” (Dawson v Page [2013] CSIH 24; 2013 S.C.
432 at p.439 para.14 per Lord McGhie.) Those
categories or classifications were however removed
by the 1960 Act, ‘[t]he fundamental aim [of which]
was to restore a broad test of reasonableness’.
(Dawson, supra, at p.439 para.14). The mode of
entry to the premises may, however, remain
relevant to whether an occupier has taken
reasonable care in terms of the 1960 Act. In
McGlone v British Railways Board, 1966 S.C. (HL)
1, 1966 S.L.T. 2, Lord Reid stated (at p.11):
“The section [s.2(1)] applies both to
trespassers and to persons entering property
by invitation or licence, express or implied.
But that does not mean that the occupier must
always show equal care for the safety of all
such persons. The care required is such care
as is reasonable and it may be reasonable to
require a greater degree of care in one such
case than in another. In deciding what degree
of care is required, in my view regard must be
had both to the position of the occupier and
to the position of the person entering his
premises and it may often be reasonable to
hold that an occupier must do more to protect
a person whom he permits to be on his
property than he need do to protect a person
who enters his property without his
permission.”
In terms of the 1960 Act, the obligation is
imposed upon the “occupier” of premises, that
being the person “occupying or having control of
land or other premises” (see s.1(1) of the 1960 Act).
The person “occupying” the property does so if he
is in possession of it- thus the owner of property
may be its occupier but the occupier might, equally,
be a tenant. Ownership is not therefore a
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precondition for liability. (It will be seen in the
discussion which follows that, in Anderson, the
defenders were held to be occupiers of the farm
premises although they were not its owners). A
person also satisfies the definition of occupier if he
or she has control of land or other premises -i.e. is
entitled to take the steps necessary to fulfil the
statutory duty (see Gallagher v Kleinwort Benson
(Trustees) Ltd 2003 S.C.L.R. 384 where Lord Reed
stated (at para.124): “The “control” of premises
which brings a person within the ambit of section
2(1) of the 1960 Act is such control of the premises
as enables that person lawfully to take the steps
which are necessary to fulfil the duty of care
imposed by that section.” This may apply, for
example, to the owner of derelict property of which
he is not actually in possession.
The occupier’s duty is owed in respect of “land
or other premises.” Land includes open pieces of
ground (see Cairns v Butlins 1989 G.W.D.
40-1879) as well as garden ground (see Hill v
Lovett, supra) and open air markets (see Mallon v
Spook Erections Ltd 1993 S.C.L.R. 845).
An occupier of land is not required to take active
measures to protect others from dangers arising
from obvious features of the landscape (whether
natural or manmade): Stevenson v Glasgow
Corporation 1908 S.C. 1034. Cliffs (see Fegan v
Highland Regional Council 2007 S.C. 723) and
rivers offer obvious examples of such features. In
Stevenson, (which arose following the drowning of
a child in the River Kelvin), Lord M’Laren stated
(at p.1039):
“The situation of a town on the banks of a
river is a familiar feature; and whether the
stream be sluggish like the Clyde at Glasgow,
or swift and variable like the Ness at
Inverness, or the Tay at Perth, there is always
danger to the individual who may be so
unfortunate as to fall into the stream. But in
none of these places has it been found
necessary to fence the river to prevent children
or careless persons from falling into the
water.”
As well as extending to land, the duty is also
owed in respect of “other premises.” The Act
applied to nursery premises in Porter v Strathclyde
Regional Council 1991 S.L.T. 446 in respect of a
slipping incident following spillage of food. The
term “other premises” also embraces, inter alia,
houses, shops and garages. The duty is not,
however, limited to heritable property but extends,
by virtue of s.1(3)(a) of the 1960 Act, to “any fixed
or moveable structure, including any vessel, vehicle
or aircraft.” Oil rigs (see Clark v Maersk Co Ltd
2000 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 9), ladders, scaffolds (see
Morton v Glasgow City Council 2007 S.L.T. (Sh
Ct) 81; 2007 Rep. L.R. 66), ferries, tractors and
helicopters therefore come within the reach of the
1960 Act.
Section 2(1) of the 1960 Act provides as follows:
“The care which an occupier of premises is
required, by reason of his occupation or
control of the premises, to show towards a
person entering thereon in respect of dangers
which are due to the state of the premises or
to anything done or omitted to be done on
them and for which the occupier is in law
responsible shall…be such care as in all the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see
that that person will not suffer injury or
damage by reason of any such danger.”
Dangers which are “due to the state of the
premises” are aptly illustrated in Taylor v Glasgow
Corporation, supra, where the poisonous berries
of a belladonna shrub in Glasgow’s Botanic
Gardens constituted precisely such a danger
(although that case predated the 1960 Act). The
duty also extends to dangers due to “anything done
or omitted to be done” on the premises-e.g. failing
to ensure that territorialWest Highland terriers were
not present in a veterinary surgery garden when the
receptionist was asked to go there to clean the
surgery windows (Hill v Lovett 1992 S.L.T. 994).
Having been bitten by one of the dogs, the pursuer
underwent a partial amputation of her leg when the
wound became infected. Liability was established
in both Taylor and Hill.
The duty imposed by the 1960 Act is not of the
most onerous nature. Some statutes impose absolute
duties (see, for example the (now superseded) duty
imposed by s.22 of the Factories Act 1937 which
is discussed in Millar v Galashiels Gas Co., 1949
S.C. (HL) 31. Other statutes impose strict liability
(see the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the
Animals (Scotland) Act 1987). The 1960 Act,
however, imposes a duty to take reasonable care
only. It does not impose a duty of insurance (see
Kirkham v Link Housing Group [2012] CSIH 58;
2012Hous. L.R. 87 at p.92 para.34). An assessment
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of whether reasonable care has been taken will
involve consideration of the nature of the danger,
the defender’s knowledge of the danger, the
probability of injury, the extent of injury, the age
and knowledge of the injured party (see Titchener
v British Railways Board [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1427;
[1983] 3 All E.R. 770; 1984 S.C. (H.L.) 34; 1984
S.L.T. 192 and Devlin v Strathclyde Regional
Council 1993 S.L.T. 699), whether he or she was
authorised to be on the premises (McGlone, supra)
and the cost of eradicating the danger. In other
words, a calculus of risk approach (which is also
utilised in the law of negligence) is adopted — see
Phee v Gordon [2013] CSIH 18; 2013 S.C. 379 at
p.388; 2013 S.L.T. 439 at p.444. There, a golf club
incurred liability under the Act in respect of its
failure to provide warning notices at a “tight” part
of the golf course. The pursuer, who was using a
nearby path, lost an eye after being struck by
another player’s tee shot. Reasonableness is to be
determined in the light of all the circumstances of
the case:McGlone, supra, at p.15 per Lord Guest.
There, a 12 year old boy climbed up an electricity
transformer and sustained an electric shock and
serious burns when he came into contact with a
bare conductor. It was held that the fence which
the British Railways Board, as occupier, had erected
around the transformer was sufficient to fulfil its
duty in terms of the 1960 Act.
Contributory negligence and volenti non fit
iniuria can operate as possible defences to an action
proceeding under the 1960 Act. Thus, in Porter v
Strathclyde Regional Council, supra, the nursery
assistant who slipped upon food which had been
spilled on the nursery floor was held to be 50%
contributorily negligent. She knew that it was a
common occurrence for food to be on the floor and
ought to have been looking out for it. If she had
done so, she would probably have been able to
avoid standing on the food and slipping. InMorton
v Glasgow City Council, a deduction of 25% was
applied to an award of damages in respect of
injuries sustained by a 14 year old boy who was
capable of realising that climbing up scaffolding
poles was a dangerous activity.
Although no breach of the statutory duty was
established in Titchener or Devlin, the respective
courts indicated that the defence of volenti would
have applied had a breach been made out. In
Titchener, the 15 year old pursuer had penetrated
a fence with gaps in it in order to take a short cut
across a railway line and was struck by a train
while, in Devlin, a 14 year old boy was killed after
having deliberately jumped on a skylight cover on
a school roof. The skylight shattered and the child
fell through the aperture to the floor below.
Anderson v Imrie— the facts
The key provisions of the 1960 Act having been
identified, attention is now turned to the facts of
Anderson v Imrie. The pursuer, Craig Anderson,
sought damages in respect of injuries which he
sustained in an accident at Hillhead Farm in East
Dunbartonshire in June 2003. At the time, the
pursuer was an eight year old schoolboy and was
playing with his friend Ben, the five-year-old son
of the defenders, John and Antoinette Imrie. The
pursuer sustained injuries to his skull and brain
when a heavy gate fell on him. It was alleged that
the accident was caused by the failure of the
defenders to take reasonable care for the pursuer’s
safety. The pursuer’s action against the defenders
proceeded on two grounds, namely alleged breach
of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 and
negligence at common law.
By the time the case came to proof before Lord
Pentland, the pursuer was 21 years of age. The
account given by the pursuer’s mother as to how
he came to be in Mrs. Imrie’s care on the relevant
day differed from that given by Mrs. Imrie. In the
event, that discrepancy was of no moment as there
was no dispute that Mrs. Imrie was responsible for
looking after the pursuer at the time of the accident.
The layout of the farm premises was spoken to
by Mr. Imrie. He explained that there were various
farm buildings constructed around a central
courtyard. Those buildings included the farmhouse
itself and a stable. In front of the stable there was
a small area used as a race or livestock crush. This
was where the pursuer’s accident occurred. The
race was an enclosed area. There were gates at both
its southern and northern ends. One could enter the
race from the courtyard by means of the southern
gate. The race had a barrier forming a wall on its
west side. Mr. Imrie indicated that a heavy stock
gate, which was to be used in the construction of a
new pen, had been moved to the race four or five
days before the accident. The gate had been left
leaning against the barrier on the left hand side of
the race but was secured to the barrier by means of
a chain and pin. The gate was chained to the barrier
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so that it did not fall over and injure either persons
or livestock. The gate was on the opposite side of
the race from the stable.
Mrs. Imrie gave evidence to the effect that she
had told the boys that they could play in the
farmhouse and in the courtyard, but that they must
not go into the race or the midden. These were dirty
and unpleasant areas which were not suitable play
areas for young children. She ensured that the gate
leading to the race from the courtyard was closed.
She was going back and forth between the
farmhouse and the courtyard. Her horse was in the
courtyard and she was dressing it. This required
her to go into the stable for items such as her tack
box and brushes. Mrs. Imrie acknowledged that she
had not been constantly watching the boys. Her
recollection was that some minutes after she had
gone into the stable, Ben exhorted her to come at
once. She found the pursuer lying on his back on
the ground in the race with the heavy stock gate on
top of him. He was clearly injured.
Although the pursuer gave evidence as to how
the accident occurred, the pursuer’s account was
not accepted by the Lord Ordinary. Preferring the
evidence of the defenders, Lord Pentland concluded
that the accident probably happened in the
following manner. The two boys were playing
together in the courtyard while Mrs. Imrie was
grooming her horse. She went into the stable to get
something and while she was there, the pursuer
climbed over the gate separating the courtyard from
the race. Once he was in the race, he climbed onto
the stock gate attached to the barrier. He lifted the
chain off the pin causing the gate to become
detached from the barrier. The gate then over
balanced on top of him. This caused him to fall
back and strike his head against the concrete surface
of the race. He ended up lying on his back on the
ground with the gate on top of him.
Although Lord Pentland concluded (for various
reasons) that the pursuer had not proved that the
accident occurred in the way set out in his
pleadings, it did not follow that the defenders
necessarily escaped liability.
The statutory case
The pursuer asserted that the defenders were the
occupiers of the farm at the relevant time for the
purposes of the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act
1960 and were in breach of the duties they owed
to him under the 1960 Act.
It has already been noted that ownership is not
a precondition for liability to arise under the 1960
Act. Although the defenders lived on the farm, it
was, in fact, owned by the first defender’s late
father. Lord Pentland held that the defenders were
however the occupiers of the farm stating (at
para.25) that “[a] person is likely to be treated as
an occupier if he has a sufficient degree of control
over premises to be able to ensure their safety and
to appreciate that a failure on his part to use
reasonable care may result in injury to persons
coming onto the premises (Wheat v E Lacon & Co
Ltd [1996] AC 552, per Lord Denning at pp.577 –
579).”
Lord Pentland went on to observe that the
defenders had lived on Hillhead Farm as a family
since 1992. There was no doubt that they occupied
the farm in the sense that they lived there. At the
time of the accident the first defender was employed
by his father to work at the farm.
Lord Pentland observed (at para.27):
“His status as an employee does not, however,
necessarily mean that he cannot at the same
time have been an occupier of the farm for the
purposes of the 1960 Act. There was ample
evidence that the defenders had practical and
effective control of the entire farm on a day
to day basis. It was their family home and as
such clearly far more than a mere place of
work.”
Members of the Anderson family gave evidence
that they had been invited to visit the farm for social
engagements and that the pursuer’s elder brother
had been allowed to play in all parts of the farm
including the farm buildings and fields. The
defenders certainly appeared to the Andersons to
be in charge of what happened at the farm and were
free to come and go as they pleased anywhere on
the farm.
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Mr. Imrie gave evidence that he had authority to
take decisions about practical matters affecting the
farm, such as where gates should be positioned and
where visitors should be allowed to go. He had the
power to make changes for safety reasons; for
example, by filling in holes or dealing with other
potential dangers.
Mrs. Imrie accepted that on the day of the
accident it was her responsibility to see that all the
relevant gates were closed and that the boys were
restricted to playing in parts of the farm where it
was safe for them to do so. She instructed them that
the race and the midden were out of bounds. She
clearly regarded it as her duty to prevent the boys
from venturing to any part of the farm that might
be dangerous.
Given the evidence which was adduced, Lord
Pentland concluded that both defenders were in a
position to take whatever steps were necessary to
ensure that the duty of care imposed under s.2(1)
of the 1960 Act was fulfilled. Accordingly, both
were “occupiers” at the material time for the
purposes of the 1960 Act.
Lord Pentland proceeded to consider whether
there had been a breach of the statutory duty by the
defenders bearing in mind that the extent of the
duty under the 1960 Act is to take reasonable care.
In approaching this issue, Lord Pentland found it
necessary to distinguish between the positions of
the two defenders.
Dealing first with Mr. Imrie, Lord Pentland
observed that, on the day of the accident, he was
working about a mile away from the farmhouse.
He did not return until after the accident had
occurred. There was no evidence to suggest that he
knew that the pursuer had come to play at the farm
that day. His Lordship stated (at para.31):
“I consider that it was reasonable forMr. Imrie
to proceed on the basis that, having secured
the stock gate to the barrier, there was no
reason to suppose that it might topple over and
injure someone. He had no reason to foresee
that anyone might interfere with it. He had no
reason to expect that the pursuer would be
playing in the race.”
Accordingly, Lord Pentland held that Mr. Imrie
was not in breach of the duty he owed as an
occupier of the farm to the pursuer.
As far as Mrs. Imrie was concerned the position
was somewhat different. She had assumed
responsibility for looking after the pursuer on the
day of the accident. She was aware that the farm
presented certain dangers to children and that it was
important to keep a close watch on them to ensure
that no accident occurred. She admitted in evidence
however that she had gone into the stable at one
point and that the boys were out of her sight for
some time. Indeed Lord Pentland observed that
there required to be sufficient time to enable the
pursuer to approach and climb over the gate giving
access to the race, clamber on to the stock gate, lift
the chain off the pin and detach the stock gate from
the barrier, thereby bringing the gate down upon
himself. Mrs. Imrie saw none of this sequence of
events.
Lord Pentland identified the “real question”(at
para.32) as being “whether in the particular
circumstances of a young child who might find the
prospect of entering the race and playing on the
gate to be irresistible, the gate presented a
foreseeable risk of causing injury.” In Lord
Pentland’s opinion, it did. His Lordship continued
(at para.33):
“In my judgment, it is fair to conclude that
Mrs. Imrie ought to have foreseen that if the
pursuer managed to get into the race he might
injure himself by interfering in someway with
the heavy stock gate. It follows…that she had
a duty to take reasonable care as an occupier
to see that the pursuer did not get into the race.
Like every other reasonable adult, Mrs. Imrie
understood that young boys do not always
abide by warnings and instructions. In my
opinion, the evidence shows that Mrs. Imrie
did not take sufficient care to ensure that the
pursuer was not injured in the race. I conclude
that she allowed him to be out of her sight and
beyond her supervision for an unreasonably
long period of time in the circumstances
prevailing that day. In my judgment he must
have been out of her sight for at least several
minutes. For a child of eight in a potentially
perilous environment, such as the farm
occupied by the defenders, that was
dangerously long. There was, in my view, a
foreseeable risk that within such a timeframe
the pursuer would suffer an accident in the
race…There was a foreseeable danger that the
pursuer would suffer injury on the farm if he
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was not sufficiently supervised by an adult.
The evidence shows, in my opinion, that the
accident happened because he was not
properly supervised.”
Lord Pentland concluded that Mrs. Imrie had
failed in the duty of care she owed to the pursuer
in terms of s.2(1) of the 1960 Act.
The case at common law
The pursuer asserted that the defenders were also
in breach of the duties they owed to him at common
law. Although this article is principally concerned
with the position under the 1960 Act, the common
law case is considered briefly here for the sake of
completeness.
Lord Pentland acknowledged that courts should
not be unduly critical of parents and those in loco
parentis in regard to the exercise of their
responsibilities towards children in their care.
Nonetheless, his Lordship drew attention to the
dictum of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers CJ in
Harris v Perry and others [2009] 1 WLR 19 (at
para.34):
“Some circumstances or activities may,
however, involve an unacceptable risk to
children unless they are subject to supervision,
or even constant surveillance. Adults who
expose children to such circumstances or
activities are likely to be held responsible for
ensuring that they are subject to such
supervision or surveillance as they know, or
ought to know, is necessary to restrict the risk
to an acceptable level.”
Lord Pentland held thatMrs Imrie was negligent
at common law because she failed to take
reasonable care to supervise the pursuer adequately
and to see that he did not get into the race and injure
himself. There was however no basis on which the
case of common law fault could be sustained
against Mr Imrie who was accordingly assoilzied.
Contributory negligence
It is well established that contributory negligence
can operate as a defence in an action proceeding
under the statutory scheme for the liability of
occupiers (see, for example, Porter, supra). For
Lord Pentland thematter of contributory negligence
in the instant case was “very much a matter of
impression” (at para.39). His Lordship found no
assistance in a number of decided cases involving
children which had been cited to him, instead taking
the view that the matter turned on the facts and
circumstances of this particular case. His Lordship
held that the pursuer was “partly to blame” for the
accident. While recognising that the pursuer was
only eight years old at the time, Lord Pentland
considered that nonetheless he would have been
aware that he should comply with Mrs. Imrie’s
instructions not to leave the courtyard and, in
particular, not to go into the race. He must have
appreciated that the race was off limits and was not
somewhere he was permitted to play. Lord Pentland
considered also that the pursuer would have had
sufficient understanding to realise that it was
dangerous to climb onto and interfere with the
heavy stock gate by detaching it from the barrier
in the race. In the circumstances, Lord Pentland
considered that the pursuer was 25% to blame for
his injuries.
Decision
Having assoilzied the first defender, Lord Pentland
found the second defender liable to make reparation
to the pursuer. The pursuer had suffered a
complicated mild traumatic brain injury, persistent
headaches and neuropsychological deficits as a
result of the accident. His employment choices were
reduced. Taking into account awards in respect of
solatium, future loss of earnings, the cost of
psychological therapy and services provided by his
mother and making the appropriate reduction in
respect of the pursuer’s contributory negligence,
Lord Pentland found the second defender liable to
make reparation to the pursuer in the total amount
of £325,976.
Conclusions
This case highlights the need for occupiers to be
alert to dangers on their premises particularly where
they have assumed responsibility for looking after
young children on those premises. In particular,
child minders who look after children in their own
homes should take heed of this judgment, as should
parents who have other children to their homes for
“play days.” Adequate supervision is imperative.
Any failure in this respect may have devastating
and far reaching consequences.
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